Association for Information Systems

AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
ECIS 2006 Proceedings

European Conference on Information Systems
(ECIS)

2006

Market valuation of strategic responses to open
source news and announcements
George Kuk
Nottingham University Business School, g.kuk@nottingham.ac.uk

Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/ecis2006
Recommended Citation
Kuk, George, "Market valuation of strategic responses to open source news and announcements" (2006). ECIS 2006 Proceedings. 106.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/ecis2006/106

This material is brought to you by the European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted
for inclusion in ECIS 2006 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact
elibrary@aisnet.org.

MARKET VALUATION OF STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO OPEN
SOURCE NEWS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS
George Kuk, Nottingham University Business School, Wollaton Road, Nottingham, NG8
1BB, United Kingdom, g.kuk@nottingham.ac.uk

Abstract
This paper examines the disruptive impact that open source (OS) software has on the mainstream
software market within the period 2001 - 2003. The findings indicate that the stock market reacted
negatively when the strategic responses of closed source incumbents were antagonistic to open source
despite their relentless effort and investment in product and service enhancement. Whereas their
counterparts that embraced open source were most likely to perform well on the stock market and
successfully enter into the emerging new markets.
Keywords: Disruptive Technology, Strategic Responses, Cumulative Abnormal Return.
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INTRODUCTION

As the press and the media have portrayed open source (OS) software as the next big disruptive
technology, the market punters and investors will have to closely study the reaction from the affected
closed source (CS) incumbents, specifically their respective strategic responses to any major OS news
and announcements such as the set up of Opengroupware.org, and the recent launch of Open Office.
The strategic responses grow out form the CS incumbents' assessment of the situation, and represent
CS core strategies to ensure continuous success in the market by either building or defending their
competitive advantages, and by improving its market position (Chen, 1996). Although the literature
has focused on strategic responses to disruptive technologies (e.g. Christensen & Overdorf, 2000),
most of the evidence is anecdotal and the theorizing remains at extending the motivation-ability
framework (Markides & Charitou, 2004), and notably the empirical investigations of the effectiveness
of different strategic responses to disruptive technologies have been lacking (Christensen, Suarez &
Utterback, 1998).
This paper intends to fill this void in research by examining the types of strategic responses that CS
incumbents used to mitigate the potential disruptive impact following a major OS news and
announcement, and empirically evaluate the effectiveness of CS strategic responses in swaying the
market to boost their share price. The rest of the paper is organized to address the following
objectives: first, to examine whether OS software bears any significant hallmarks of a disruptive
technology; second, to identify the core strategic responses based on a qualitative analysis of the
exchanges of news and announcements between OS and the affected CS incumbents in the period
2001-2003; third, to posit and empirically test the impact that each strategic response has on the
market; and lastly to discuss the implications of the present findings to both theory and practice.
1.1

Disruptive Characteristics of OS

Within the literature of innovations, scholars make the distinction between incremental and radical
innovations (Utterback, 1994; Afuah & Bahram, 1995). Incremental innovations rely on improving the
existing production methods to produce better products with performance attributes that the
mainstream customers find appealing. The underlying rationale is to build upon the previous successes
and enhance what firms have acquired in terms of dynamic capabilities, know-how and competencies.
Whereas radical innovations come about as a result of scientific and technological breakthroughs that
do not require and/or build on the firms’ current capabilities, and importantly have the effect of
devaluating the existing products. In many respects, OS products are similar to their CS counterparts
despite the differences in terms of the design processes (Bonaccorsi & Rossi, 2003; Scacchi, 2004),
and the underlying drivers for innovation and technological development (von Hippel and von Krogh,
2003). The major similarities include: that both OS and CS rely on processes of incremental
improvement; and that they both offer a general and similar set of functionalities and performance
attributes. Hence, at least with respect to innovations, OS is not radically different from CS.
So is OS a disruptive technology? According to Bower and Christensen (1995), technological changes
that damage incumbents or established companies are usually not radically new or different from a
technological point of view. The new technology, however, introduces a new package of features,
which have the potential of changing the nature of competition in the market. These technologies
typically present a different package of performance and product attributes, which initially do not
appeal to the mainstream customers. Yet as the attributes improve, the product will eventually enter
the market as a “good-enough” alternative to allure the mainstream customers to switch. A significant
tipping point for product switching is when the mainstream products overshoot the customers’ needs,
and customers find themselves not only being over-served technologically by their vendors but also at
the same time paying higher licence fees.
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Specific to OS software, the release of source codes to its users is an attribute that not only results in
greater flexibility for users to tailor and modify applications to suit their unique requirements 1 but also
generates a degree of freedom from dependencies on a single provider (Kaufman, Tucci & Brumer,
2003). CS creates and increases the dependence of its users on the CS developer for support,
installation and problem fixing. Occasionally, these dependencies force the users to upgrade their
products even when the added benefit is not needed or obvious to them2. Another significant attribute
is that disruptive technologies offer a lower cost alternative to the established players. Licensing costs,
for example, can be zero with OS software. With Linux, non-corporate users simply download and
install the software from the Internet. Netproject (2003) reported that the total cost of ownership with
Linux on the desktop was 35% that of Microsoft Windows resulting in a 65% savings. These savings
came from the elimination of license fees for both the system software and office software, elimination
of vendor churn that forces unnecessary software updates, reduction in the number of software
security updates and reduction in the number of support staff.
OS products are increasingly being seen as a viable product substitute and potentially a category killer
to the mainstream software products. Its properties of being cheaper, more flexible, and its
development process that taps into communities of developers, provide the needed incentives for
companies to depart from the prevailing technology. In the last decade, OS products have captured a
large share of the established market. One indication of this growth is the prevalence of adoption and
usage of OS products, among the high profile ones in the market including Apache for web servers,
Linux for the server operating systems, and MySQL for the databases.
The growth of OS products is evident and CS vendors are sitting up and taking notice. The Goliath
amongst them, Microsoft, acknowledges OS products as a threat, and in January 2001, its CEO Steve
Ballmer publicly announced, "Linux the biggest threat to Microsoft." Other CS vendors are also
aware of this and have taken actions such as openly denouncing OS on issues of security and support
or taken a more collaborative approach such as modifying its product to run on OS software and/or
offering support for OS products at a fee.
As a result of the inherent differences in organizational assets (Srivastava, Shervani and Fahey, 1999;
Wernerfelt, 1984), the CS incumbents are expected to differ in their strategic responses to OS
products. Most of the current frameworks are derived from a defender perspective with two key
considerations: the motivation and the ability to defend (e.g. Christensen & Raynor, 2003; Charitou &
Markides, 2003). But in the 1990s as OS has become more amenable to commercial investors3, the
landscape of the software industry has changed dramatically from an antagonistic stance to a more
neutral and benign one which provides the opportunity for cooperation between the OS developers and
the CS vendors. In the following section, we report the types of strategic responses identified on the
basis of a qualitative analysis of the competitive interaction between CS and OS in their exchanges of
news and announcements (examples are included in the Appendix; and for a detailed description of the
procedures for data collection and analysis, see the method section), and posit the effectiveness of
1

A case in point, operating systems and word processing software support only a limited range of
languages. Iceland, in order to help preserve its language, wanted Icelandic support added to Microsoft
Windows and was willing to pay for its modification. Microsoft, however, was not prepared to
translate or localize Windows into the Icelandic language as the market was too small to justify the
effort (Vermeer, 1999). In such an instance, OS software provided a more attractive option as the
source code of the operating system is available and can be freely modified, and developers were able
to add support for the language of their choice.
2
When Microsoft decided to end its volume licensing in 2001 and support by 2002 for Windows 95,
the existing users were forced to switch to the more expensive Windows 2000 if they wish to continue
running those applications (Foley, 2000).
3
During this period, Debian, an organization established to disseminate Linux, introduced a licensing
agreement to bundle OS developed codes with proprietary code.
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each strategic response in combating the potential disruptive impact following a major OS news and
announcement.
Table 1. Strategic Responses to Open Source Announcement
Strategic Response
Associative Product
Enhancement

Definition
Enhanced the existing
bundle of services and
functionalities through
incorporating open source
capabilities

Illustrative Example
Sun Microsystems announced its plan in enhancing its
instant messaging (IM) service by releasing a
standalone IM server in response to the latest sign of
booming demand for corporate IM services. This
appeared to be a prospector's move to the greater
acceptance of Linux in the high-end server market.

Associative
Collaboration

Embraced Open Source
through strategic
alignment, new business
venture and source code
release
Targeted lower tier of the

RealNetworks announced in its plan in following the
open source trend by releasing the source code of its
audio and video player to run on the Linux operating
system.

Associative Price
(Lower Tier Market)

Antagonistic Product
Enhancement

Antagonistic New
Product

Antagonistic Price
(Upper Tier Market)

1.2

Red Hat announced its plan in releasing database
software to target small and medium sized businesses.
As an early investor in Red Hat, Oracle was counting
on offering a more attractive pricing plan to coincide
with the release of new 9i for capturing more market
share.
Provided additional
In response to the challenge of OpenGroupware.org,
functionalities and services Microsoft announced its plan in allowing Mac OSX
to counteract similar
users to access corporate e-mail and calendar
offerings by open source
information stored on a Microsoft Exchange server.
products and/or
This was regarded by the market as a move to capture
partnerships
the new Mac OSX users and notably to retain its
existing Exchange users.
Offered new products as a Oracle released a new portal software to drive sales of
defensive move to retain
its database and application server, and of its business
market share
software. This was a reaction to the collaboration
between IBM and MySQL, and was seen as a move to
defend its market share.
market by using
competitive pricing and
offering lower-cost
alternatives

Targeted upper tier of the
market by charging
according to the customers'
unique requirement

MS announced its Office bundling plans to help
volume licensing businesses to manage cost by
tailoring the productivity tools to needs. This was a
reaction to the developments in StarOffice and was a
move to defend its market share.

Strategic Responses

Table 1 shows the strategic responses with their respective definitions and illustrative examples. The
six strategic responses dovetail with the motivation-ability framework, but also include the
opportunity the OS brings to the CS vendors. For the first three strategic responses, the nature and the
extent of cooperation vary. The associative product enhancement characterizes the opportunistic move
by CS vendors in improving their product capabilities and compatibilities by bundling and
incorporating OS with their proprietary products and/or codes. For the associative collaboration, CS
vendors go further by releasing their source codes to the OS developers, and often pump prime
resources to sponsor further code development. And for the third strategic response, as the market for
OS products is small and low margin business, competitive pricing offers a lower-cost alternative to
encourage the mainstream customers to switch form their existing more higher-cost products.
The three associative strategies signify a more neutral and benign stance taken by CS vendors. The
first two strategic responses in particular, not only substantially reduce the potential high cost related
to R&D but also shorten the product life cycle. Kaufman et al. (2003) advocated that firms
(suppliers/manufacturers) often co-specialize their assets to gain efficiencies, and collaborate in longterm relationships to optimize on transaction costs. These relationships allow firms in the supply chain
to engage in joint product design and concurrent engineering, to share personnel and equipment, and
importantly to leverage financial and marketing resources strategically and speedily. In effect,
although the OS market is a small and low profit margin business, this is compensated by the
associative strategic responses that serve to increase adoption and to facilitate CS vendors to enter the
emerging OS market.
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A primary decision criterion in creating collaborative efforts and alliances is the potential impact on
shareholders’ wealth (Das, Sen & Sengupta, 1998). If investors perceive the move as increasing the
returns or decrease risks, stock prices will increase. Conversely, deals that jeopardize the health of the
firm will result in a significant drop in stock prices. Other studies examine the effect of reputation as
informational signal to the marketplace regarding future cash flows of the firms. An alliance and
collaboration with a reputed partner can send a credible signal to the market about a firm’s true level
of quality. Taken together, we formulate the following three hypotheses:
H1a: The market will react positively towards the strategic responses that take the stance of
associative product enhancement
H1b: The market will react positively towards the strategic responses that take the stance of
associative collaboration
H1c. The market will react positively towards the strategic responses that take the stance of
associative pricing.
With respect to the antagonistic strategic responses, the underlying strategic intent is in defending
market share by expanding effort and investment in product and service enhancement (Antagonistic
Product Enhancement); by introducing a new product aimed at competing with its OS equivalent
(Antagonistic New Product); and by pricing in accordance with the unique requirements of the upper
tier of the market (Antagonistic Pricing).
Although there is some evidence that the stock market generally reacted positively in the first few days
after the new products launch and announcement (Chaney, Devinney & Winer, 1991), research in the
market valuation of emerging and competing technologies suggests the opposite. Pardue, Higgns and
Biggart (2000) studied the relationship between new IT product and announcement during the two eras
of technical advance in the period 1981 to 1994. The era of incremental technical change was
characterized by a period where there was a dominant design in the marketplace and incremental
changes were made to the dominant design. New designs would have a hard time winning a market
share. The era of ferment, on the other hand, was a period when several new designs are introduced
and challenged the old design. Using the event study methodology, they classified the announcements
as either competing with the emerging technology or competing with existing dominant design. The
findings indicate that the market reacted negatively to new product announcements during an era of
ferment whereas the results were not significant for new product announcements during an era of
incremental technical change; and that during the era of incremental technical change, the market
reacted negatively to announcements on new product that competed with emerging technology
whereas announcements that competed with the emerging technology was found to be non-significant.
There are two plausible factors that led to the negative market valuation. First, investors interpret the
information conveyed in new product announcements as signalling negative future cash flows for the
announcing firms. Second, the investors’ expectations rise with new products launch to a point when
the product enhancements and new products failed to meet the investors’ expectation. Here, we offer a
third plausible factor that further technological advancement will exacerbate the ready over-servicing
impact that the current CS products have had on the mainstream customers. Taken together, we
formulate the following hypotheses:
H2a: The market will react negatively towards announcement that takes the stance of antagonistic
product enhancement.
H2b: The market will respond negatively towards announcement that takes the stance of antagonistic
new product.
The last strategic response taken by CS incumbents was to cut the price of their products and services
or create alternate cheaper pricing packages for their customer base. OS products are often available
without a fee and with low maintenance and support cost. This poses a threat to the CS incumbents,
and as a result they have to use strategic tactics on the basis of pricing such as offering different
product and service packages at varying prices to different consumer segments. Price adjustments are
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not costless (Sheshinki & Weiss, 1992). There are real costs associated with the transmission of the
price information to customers and with the decision process itself. However, price changes may be
required either because of structural shifts in demands or due to a change in the general price level.
Price has often been used as an indicator of quality. Verma and Gupta (2004) investigated the
perception of price on durable and non-durable goods, and found that consumers perceive higher price
to mean higher quality. They noted that consumers are more likely to use price as an indicator of
quality when the products in questions are expensive. As price increases, the risk of an incorrect
decision increases as the buyer is often less familiar with the product due to infrequent purchase. In
such situations, simple rules such as “getting what you pay for” determine consumers’ decisions. The
perception that price is an indicator of quality was also found to be true under conditions of extreme
market volatility for tangible goods (Esposto, 1998). However, consumers also have lower and upper
price thresholds (Ofir, 2004). Low prices falling outside of this threshold will be perceived by
consumers as a signal for suspect product and therefore be unacceptable; and high prices above the
threshold for the product will be considered too expensive and deter purchase.
The use of price promotion, defined as a short-term price cut, is well documented. Inman (1990, 1993)
has shown that even without an actual decrease in price, promotion signal will result in an increase of
sales. Promotion signal refers to any sign, marker, or other indicator of a price promotion to draw
consumers’ attention to a special offer. Over time, some consumers interpret a promotion marker as a
proxy for a price cut so the simple presence of a promotion signal leads the consumers to presume that
the price of the promoted brand has been discounted.
Pricing decisions are often made by the incumbents to defend their market share (Hauser, 1988). As
the literature has shown, this strategy is effective to increase sales, at least in the short term, if the new
price falls within the consumers’ price threshold. Here the CS incumbents adopt a differential pricing
model to appeal across different consumer segments, specifically the upper tier market with a higher
profit margin where consumers are more demanding in their software needs and requirement. The
strategic tactic is to reinforce the notion of “getting what you pay for”. Taken together, we formulate
the following hypothesis:
H2c: The market will respond positively towards announcement that takes the stance of antagonistic
pricing
Table 2. Key Determinants of the Relationship between Strategic Responses and Market Valuation
Strategic Response

Strategic Intent

Profit
Margin

Resource
Implications

Technology
Development Model

Lead
Time

OverServing

Market
Valuation

Associative Product
Enhancement (AsPrEn)

Increase
adoption

Mainly
low

Low

Emphasizing "plug &
play" and "componentbased" solutions

Short

No

+

Associative Collaboration
(AsCo)

Enter new
markets

Mainly
low

Medium

Moving towards a
modular architecture

Short

No

+

Associative Price: Lower
Tier Market (AsPr)

Increase
adoption

Low

Low

Emphasizing "plug &
play" and "componentbased" solutions

Short

No

+

Medium

Remaining within the
integrated architecture

Moderate

Yes

-

Antagonistic Product
Enhancement (AnPrEn)

Retain existing Medium to
customers
High

Antagonistic New Product
(AnNePr)

Compete with
new entrants

Low to
Medium

High

Ranging from modular to
integrated architectures

Long

Yes

-

Antagonistic Price: Upper
Tier Market (AnPr)

Retain existing
customers

High

Low

Remaining within the
integrated architecture

Short

No

+

Note : Resource implications in terms of co-specialized assets, project management, re-structuring, etc.
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Table 2 provides a summary of the underlying key determinants between the six strategic responses
and the market valuation.

2

METHODS

Considering that the present research focus was on the CS incumbents’ strategic responses to major
OS news and announcements within the period 2001 to 2003, we adopted the “competitiveinteraction” framework (Chen & MacMillan, 1992) to guide our data collection. As the previous
classification (which was derived from the motivation-ability model) might limit the scope of strategic
responses, we opted for an inductive approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1990) to
analyze the exchanges of news and announcements between OS and CS, and followed by an
independent coding procedure to establish the inter-coder reliability of the induced classification. And
to gauge the impact of strategic responses on the market valuation of the CS incumbents, we used and
implemented the event study methodology strictly adhered to the guidelines advocated by McWilliams
and Siegel (1997).
2.1

Description of Data

The data were collected using the Internet as the primary source of information. We first obtained a
listing of all CS firms that were traded on the American stock exchanges including NASDAQ and
NYSE. The initial list comprised of 549 firms, and was then sorted according to their market
capitalization. Because we were interested in firms that would be primarily featured in the news, we
limited our firm selection to the top 30 firms. We then analyzed the firms individually based on the
Reuters Internet database (www.investor.reuters.com). The purpose was to understand the types of CS
products, and importantly to exclude firms if there were no OS equivalents available in the
marketplace. This exercise reduced the number of firms to 13.
The next step was to obtain a listing of well-known OS projects. Instead of using the official open
source website (www.opensource.org) which might provide biased information, we used the
Wikipedia website (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opensource) to identify all the prominent OS
products and projects. At the initial count, there were 416. We then carried out a cursory review of
each OS project by visiting its respective website. OS projects that were not in stages of development
were discarded as any of their respective news and announcements were unlikely to elicit a response
from the CS incumbents. We further screened for OS projects and products that directly challenged the
five most commercially profitable applications including databases, document editing, media,
networking and Internet, and lastly operating systems. The final number of OS products and projects
were 165.
Next, we searched for the OS news and announcements on the CNET (a leading Internet based
technology news source) within the study period from January 1, 2001 through December 31, 2003.
This search generated 1671 hits. As we were interested in OS projects and products within the five
most profit applications, we discarded all the unrelated OS news and announcements. This resulted in
45 announcements. To ensure that we did not accidentally eliminate or overlook any significant
announcements, we repeated the above procedure using another weekly Internet technology news
service, Computer Hope (www.computerhope.com/newslet.htm). The second search generated 47
announcements. This resulted in a 4.3% margin of error for the process of identifying major OS news
and announcements.
Regarding CS news and announcements, we again used the CNET to search for all major news of the
13 CS firms. The initial search resulted in 116 CS announcements. We then eliminated all
announcements where there existed the possibilities of contamination by other confounding effects
(such as dividend announcement, law suits and so forth) that had an inevitable impact on the firms’
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stock price. A listing of all the confounding effect was provided in the Appendix. The final number of
CS announcements was 72.
We next consolidated the news and announcements of OS and CS into a single Excel file,
chronologically arranging OS in one column and CS in another. First, we attempted to identify the
number of “competitive-interaction” pairs where each pair was characterized by the actions triggered
by OS and the reactions from CS counterparts. This resulted in 31 pairs comprised of 59 (27 OS and
32 CS) announcements. Second, in studying the contents of the announcements, we adopted an open
coding methodology (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1990). This approach required an
iterative process of theoretical sampling, which amounted to compare and contrast the news and
announcements exchanged between OS and CS. The aim was to build a series of theoretical
categories, which were then compared and interrelated to gauge the strategic intent of each firm. The
coding stopped once there were no more emergences of new theoretical categories. This happened
around the coding of 60% of the news and announcements. Here the theoretical categories took the
form of the six strategic responses (reported earlier). Two researchers then coded the contents of the
exchanges of the 31 competitive- interaction pairs independently. The coding yielded an inter-coder
reliability of 87%. The third party then resolved any disagreement.
2.2

Method of Analysis

We applied the event study methodology to assess the stock market valuation of strategic responses to
OS news and announcements. The methodology was used here to measure any significant abnormal
returns in stock prices following the strategic responses announced by CS firms, assuming that the
information content contained in the announcement would be rapidly and rationally reflected in traded
stock prices (Wells, 2004). The use of abnormal returns is common in the accounting and finance
literature to represent a risk-adjusted return in excess of the average stock market return around the
announcement date. Briefly, the method begins by gauging the actual stock returns over the period of
interest (comprised of estimation and event windows), and followed by computing the difference
between the returns that were predicted and the returns that actually occurred. If the difference
between the actual results and the predicted results is determined to be statistically different from zero,
it may be concluded that the event (in this case, the CS strategic response) triggered the stock market
to adjust the market value of the firm following the announcement.
For this research, the CS announcement date was defined as day 0, and the estimation period from day
-49 to day -2. The event of window of interest began on day -1 and ended on day +5. Following the
suggestion by McWilliams and Siegel (1997), we used a shorter event window considering that the
software development is a high velocity industry where events occurred at a rapid rate and news may
be of little significance a short period after the announcement. The inclusion of day -1 in the event
window aimed to capture any information leakage pertaining to the knowledge of when an OSS
application was to be released. Hence, to ensure our sampling framework was reliable and to
authenticate the exact date of the news and announcement, we checked the announcement date with
other Internet technology news sources. This yielded a 1% margin of error.
Finally, as there were only 31 competitive-interaction pairs, the non-parametric Corrado rank test was
used to assess the impact of each strategic response on the market valuation, and for the overall effect
of antagonistic and associative strategic responses, the parametric Corrado T-test was used. Both tests
are generally well specified and robust (Corrado, 1989; Corrado & Zivney, 1992), and particularly
suited to the event clustering among observations when using the market model as a return generating
process (as in the present study). Traditional non-parametric tests such as the signed-rank and sign
tests, assume that the Central Limit Theorem holds, and that the analyzed sample is large enough for
the theorem to be applied. Corrado rank test, however, was based on the computation of ranks of
abnormal returns, which were independent of the degree of skewness commonly observed in the
distribution of abnormal returns. For each firm in our present sample, the rank test first merged the
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abnormal returns observed in both the estimation and the event window, and then ranked them
accordingly. The detailed computation can be found in Campbell and Wasley (1993).
Table 3: Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Corrado Rank Test (in parenthesis) for Associative and Antagonistic
Strategic Responses
Associative Strategic Response
Product
Pricing: Lower
Enhancement
Collaboration
Tier Market

Trading Day
Relative to
Strategic
Response

n=4

n=5

-1
0
1
2

0.016 (1.000) *
0.028 (1.089) †
0.015 (2.607)
0.028 (1.393)

0.013 (2.161)
0.016 (2.536)
0.048 (1.964)
0.044 (2.625)

3
4
5

0.036 (1.304)
0.032 (2.161)
0.035 (1.964)

0.062 (1.268)
0.054 (3.304)
0.061 (1.893)

Antagonistic Strategic Response
Product
Pricing: Upper
Enhancement
New Product
Tier Market

n =2

*

n=6

n=9

-0.016 (1.696)
-0.020 (1.161)
-0.013 (0.714)
-0.013 (0.929)

-0.008 (4.286)
-0.009 (3.286)
-0.014 (3.250)
-0.011 (2.321)

0.003 (0.304)
0.004 (0.982)
-0.007 (1.464)

** -0.008 (2.214)
-0.004 (2.500)
-0.009 (4.071)

n=5

0.002 (4.857)
-0.005 (4.571)
0.009 (3.286) †
0.011 (3.946)

0.013 (1.946)
0.030 (1.982)
0.036 (2.464)
0.041 (2.571)

-0.049 (3.607)
-0.060 (5.536)
-0.051 (3.946)

0.066 (1.536) †
0.072 (2.375)
0.080 (2.804)

Note: † p ! 0.1, * p ! 0.05, ** p ! 0.01.

3

RESULTS

Table 3 gives the cumulative abnormal returns a day before and five days after the CS strategic
response announcement. It can be seen from Table 3 that abnormal returns were positive with the
announcement of strategic responses that took the stance of associative product enhancement and
collaboration, and antagonistic pricing whereas the abnormal returns for the associative pricing, and
the antagonistic product enhancement and new product were somewhat mixed.
For the associative product enhancement, abnormal returns on a day before and a day after the
announcement were statistically significant at the level of 0.05 and 0.1 respectively. This provides
support for H1a. And the results also support H1b and H1c as the abnormal returns on day 3 after the
announcements of the associative collaboration and pricing were also found to be statistically
significant. To illustrate the above results graphically, we use Figure 1a to provide a plot of the
cumulated abnormal returns of the 11 days surrounding the announcement day 0 for each strategic
response.
Figure 1b. Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Antagonistic Strategic Responses

Figure 1a. Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Associative Strategic
Responses
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The patterns of the impacts of associative product enhancement and collaboration on the market
valuation displayed an upward trend, which is consistent with the view that the market’s responding
slowly over the event window. For the associative pricing, there was a delay in the market’s reaction.
To test the overall effect of associative strategic responses, we merged all the data, and then subject
the data to the parametric Corrado T-Test. As shown in Table 4, the overall associative strategic
responses earned significant and positive abnormal returns on day 3.
With regard to the impact of antagonistic strategic responses on the market valuation, Table 3 provides
a somewhat mixed picture. For the antagonistic product enhancement, H2a was not supported as the
market did not respond and the cumulative abnormal returns over the 11 days surrounding the
announcement were flat (as shown in Figure 1b). For the antagonistic new product, contrary to the
prediction of H2b that the market would react negatively, on day 1 after the announcement, the
abnormal return was positive and moderately significant. Further inspection of the trend (as displayed
in Figure 1b) suggests that the market started to adjust on day 2, and the overall trend was negative.
And for the antagonistic pricing, we find partial support for H2c as the abnormal returns on day 3 after
the announcement was positive and moderately significant. As for the overall effect of antagonistic
responses, Table 4 indicates the market reacted negatively on day 3 after the announcement. In
contrast to the associative responses, which yielded a significant increase of 1.37% of the market
value, the antagonistic responses decreased the market value of the CS incumbents significantly by
2.02%.
Table 4. Average Daily Abnormal Returns (in %) and Cumulative Average Daily Returns (in %) from
1 Day before through 5 days after the Strategic Response Announcements
Associative Strategic Response
Trading Day Average Daily
Relative to
Abnormal
Strategic
Return
Response
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5

0.9
0.48
1.12
0.29
1.37
-0.45
0.22

Corrado TStatistic

-0.63
-0.7
-0.21
-0.55
-2.59
0.93
-0.18

Antagonistic Strategic Response

Cumulative Average Daily
Average Daily
Abnormal
Returns (in %)
Return

0.9
1.38
2.5
2.79
4.16
3.71
3.94

0.17
0.07
0.64
0.33
-2.02
-0.19
0.44

Corrado TStatistic

Cumulative
Average Daily
Returns (in %)

0.86
-0.13
-0.79
-0.92
-2.09
0.32
0.65

0.17
0.24
0.88
1.21
-0.81
-1.01
-0.57

Note. Corrado T-statistic in bold is statistically significant at the 5% level.

4

DISCUSSION

As OS software and products continue to proliferate, CS incumbents increasingly must respond.
Future competitive advantage and continuous success in the market rests on the ability of the CS
incumbents to initiate and implement the right strategy (Markides & Charitou, 2004). To address this
important research issue, we empirically investigate the influence of strategic responses on the market
valuation of CS incumbents. Our results, in which stock prices serve as the market value of the CS
incumbents, suggest that as a whole the stock market reacted negatively towards the antagonistic but
positively towards the associative strategic responses. Among the strategic responses that led to
positive and significant abnormal returns, CS incumbents that embraced OS were more likely to
perform well in the stock market and successfully enter the newly emerging OS/CS markets than their
counterparts that strongly opposed OS. It seems that with a neutral and benign stance towards OS, CS
incumbents can easily absorb OS either by incorporating OS into their products or by entering into
new business ventures and partnership with OS. Both strategies present a positive signal to the market
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that newly bundled CS products with enhanced OS capabilities not only satisfying the existing
consumers but also appealing across different consumer segments including those who are currently
using both OS and CS, and possibly those who are strictly OS users. In general, the above results
agree with the literature that technological alliances benefit firms not only in terms of cost advantage
through savings in product development but also in terms of entry to the new markets (Das et al.,
1998).
With the three antagonistic responses, the overall effects were negative although there were moderate
significant and positive abnormal returns relating to new product and pricing. For the antagonistic
product enhancement, the market did not seem to react at all. There are two plausible reasons
including that the market investors failed to understand the newly released product information to an
already complicated product; and that the market investors failed to appreciate the significance of the
incremental changes or improvement made to the existing products (Pardue et al., 2000). For the
antagonistic new products, the market reaction was somewhat mixed. The trend followed an inverted
U relationship with the initial moderate significant upsurge quickly corrected by the market. A
plausible explanation is that because our sample comprised only the top 13 firms in the computing and
software industry, the market was likely to initially equate firm reputation to profitable products, and
the quick adjustment might be due to the product reviews and the actual sales of the new product
(Chaney et al., 1991). And lastly, the market seems to regard the antagonistic pricing as the most
effective and aggressive way of defending market share and of retaining the existing customers within
the same industry (Shankar, 1999). However, the overall negative effect indicates that the market
perceived the antagonistic responses as a signal of weakness and evoked a lower investor enthusiasm
than the associative responses. In effect, the deployment of antagonistic strategic responses incurred
an opportunity cost on the CS incumbents as a result of the lost opportunity in reaping the potential
benefits presented by OS.
4.1

Limitations and future research implications

The present study relies on secondary data for the empirical tests, and thus our investigation is limited
to the variables that we could obtain. For example, the data sampling relies heavily on announcements
that were prominently featured on the news; hence to increase the likelihood of media coverage, our
sample is limited to the top CS companies. In so doing, this precludes many of the smaller software
companies in this research. Furthermore, as the present study was situated in a high velocity
environment characterized by high market and technological turbulence, the stock prices of the CS
companies were likely to be subjected to a wide range of multiple confounding variables (see
Appendix). Whilst there are suggestions of how to control the confounding variables statistically, the
possibility of contamination is still high and may render difficulties in the analysis and subsequent
interpretation (Meznar, Nigh & Kwok, 1998; McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). In choosing between
contamination and limited generabilizability, we decided to discard all the contaminated
announcements with the intention that future research can use the present findings as an exploratory
guide to collect more data.
In formulating our present hypotheses, we assumed that the announcements of OS would have zero
impacts on the CS stock prices. To test the validity of this assumption, we used the OS announcement
date to gauge any changes on the CS stock prices, and no significant findings were then found. Also,
we suggest that strategic responses determine the market valuation, however, it is possible that market
valuation drives strategic responses. In our present sample, only one case had a follow-up
announcement and yet this bore no significant impact on the abnormal return. Future research should
consider this possibility in the analysis. Lastly, our inductive approach in the derivation of the strategic
responses is by no means exhaustive. For example, within the study period 2001 – 2003, there was no
incident whereby two CS competitors entered into collaboration and/or strategic alliances. But again
with a larger sampling time frame, CS competitors might decide to collaborate as a way to destruct the
OS disruptive impact (Kaufman et al., 2003).
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4.2

Theoretical Implications

The two primary theoretical contributions of this research are the extension of the motivation-ability
framework and the linking of the influence of strategic responses to the market valuation of the CS
incumbents. First, contrary to most disruptive technologies that threatened the survival of the
incumbents, the OS presents an opportunity for CS incumbents not only to diversify their product
offerings but also to enable entering the newly emerging OS/CS markets. The contrast of the impact
on the market valuation between the associative and the antagonistic strategic responses clearly
demonstrates the significance of opportunity that the motivation-ability framework failed to address.
Second, in an area when theory lags behind practice, the linking of strategic responses to shareholder
wealth not only allows a direct testing of the most advanced thinking regarding the right strategic
responses to disruptive technologies but also serves the basis for any further theorizing. For example,
as the associative strategic responses are opportunistic and in effect, indirectly exploiting the public
collective actions that successfully fuel the development of pure OS projects (von Hippel & von
Krogh, 2003), the sustainability of this new OS/CS arrangement, and importantly the market
valuations of both short- and long-term impact of different commercially sponsored OS projects,
provide new avenues for further theorizing and empirical testing. Finally, in terms of methodology, as
most of the past research relies heavily upon questionnaire design and hence suffers from common
method bias; by collecting secondary data longitudinally, the present study provides useful insight in
the relationship between strategic responses and the market value of the CS incumbents.
4.3

Managerial Implications

This research has shed light on two important strategic issues for managers: the value of various
strategic responses to OS and their immediate impact on the market valuation of the firm. The present
findings suggest that a neutral and benign strategy to OS not only ensures CS firms to gain a foothold
in the newly OS/CS market but also results in a short-term gain in the market valuation. Whereas the
strategic responses that oppose OS can backfire and undermine the stock market confidence despite
the relentless effort and investment in product and service enhancement. It might seem that the
significant abnormal returns is only a small fraction of the market value of the firms (1.37% increase
and 2.02% decrease for associative and antagonistic respectively), depending on the trading volumes
of the respective stocks, the respective dollar values can be millions. Against this, CS incumbents
might want to adopt a thinking-outside-the-box attitude: first, by considering outside the “motivationability” stance by realizing the opportunity cost as the result of acceptance of a defensive strategy;
second, by taking OS as an opportunity to induce states of non-equilibrium needed for organizational
self-renewal and creativity; and lastly, by expanding the dynamic capabilities to develop their lateral
capabilities in integrating technologies and market opportunities.
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APPENDIX
Summary of the Number of Confounding Effects between 2001 and 2003
Restructuring

Dividend/
Earnings

Adobe
Systems Inc

3

Apple
Computers

5

Acquisition

Litigation/
Labour

4

Executive
Changes

1

Forecasted
Changes
in Earnings

Layoffs

3

2

11

1

BEA

2

Borland

1

1

1

2

3

7

Computer
Assoc

2

Cisco
Systems

1

IBM

4

Microsoft

3

5
7

6

Novell

3

3

Oracle

9

1

2
3
7

7

SCO Group

13

RealNetworks

1

Sun
Microsystem

3

2

1

2

6

Examples of Reactions by CS developers to OSS Announcements
OSS Announcements

Reaction by CS

14

Contract
Awards

1

5

15

Debt or
Equity
Related

3

2-Oct-01

Sun releases beta of StarOffice 6.0: Sun
Microsystems unveiled the beta of
StarOffice 6.0, a streamlined version of
the company's free office software that's
aimed to gain ground against Microsoft's
Office

14-Jan02

Microsoft releases new Office XP tools: MS
launched new tools for linking its Office
desktop software into its growing .Net Web
services plan

10-May02

OpenOffice released to 'pre-alpha'
version to Mac OS: OpenOffice.org
released its software in version 1.0 which
includes the key desktop applications,
such as a word processor, spreadsheet,
presentation manager, and drawing
program, with a user interface and
feature set similar to other office suites

2-Jun02

Microsoft polishes Office for Apple: MS
plans to release on Monday the first
significant update to the Mac OS X version of
Office and will also introduce a version of its
instant messaging program designed for the
latest Mac operating system

Sun working on StarOffice update: Sun
Microsystems next week will begin
offering a trial edition of the next version
of its StarOffice software

9-Mar03

Microsoft rebrands Office for enterprises:
Microsoft on Monday plans to rebrand its
flagship productivity suite as "Office
System," in an attempt to reposition the
software as a base on which businesses can
custom-build products

15-Mar01

Linux standardisation effort goes ahead:
The effort to standardize the way Linux
works has moved several steps closer to
reality in the last two weeks through
Linux Standard Base with involvement
from IBM, Intel, Oracle, Red Hat,
Caldera, SuSE and others

24Mar-01

Mac enthusiasts test drive OS X: Macintosh
launches OS X and users get to try OS X

28-Mar01

SuSE Linux announces upcoming release
of SuSE Linux 7.1 PowerPC Edition

9-Apr01

MS introduces Windows XP to 500 testers:
MS announced the second test version of its
Windows XP operating system and the first
version that shows off the new look and feel
of the software

19-Jun-01

Red Hat to play in Oracle's arena by
announcing database software

26-Jun01

Oracle software users getting more options:
Oracle outlined a list of new delivery options
for its hosted software Tuesday and signed
partnerships to support its newly revamped
strategy via Oracle.com

14-Jan-03

Mainframes get open-source database:
MySQL has released a version of its
software for IBM's mainframe line

17-Jan03

Oracle polishes portal software: Oracle will
release software designed to make it easier
for business users to access data through a
Web browser

7-Mar-03

15

